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NON-ZERO-SUM STOPPING GAMES IN CONTINUOUS TIME
ZHOU ZHOU
Abstract. On a filtered probability space (Ω,F , (Ft)t∈[0,∞],P), we consider the two-player non-
zero-sum stopping game ui := E[U i(ρ, τ )], i = 1, 2, where the first player choose a stopping strategy
ρ to maximize u1 and the second player chose a stopping strategy τ to maximize u2. Unlike the
Dynkin game, here we assume that U(s, t) is Fs∨t-measurable. Assuming the continuity of U
i in
(s, t), we show that there exists an ǫ-Nash equilibrium for any ǫ > 0.
1. Introduction
On a filtered probability space (Ω,F , (Ft)t∈[0,∞],P), we consider the two-player non-zero-sum
stopping game ui(ρ, τ) := E[U i(ρ, τ)], i = 1, 2, where the first player choose a stopping strategy
ρ to maximize u1 and the second player chose a stopping strategy τ to maximize u2. Unlike the
Dynkin game, here we assume that U(s, t) is Fs∨t-measurable instead of Fs∧t-measurable. That is,
the game ends at the maximum of ρ and τ . Moreover, ρ and τ are not stopping times. They are
some strategies satisfying some non-anticipativity condition. By assuming the continuity of U i in
(s, t), we show that there exists an ǫ-Nash equilibrium for any ǫ > 0.
We first provide some results in the zero-sum case. In particular, we construct an ǫ-saddle point.
(A more general version for the zero-sum case has been studied in [1].) Then we construct an ǫ-Nash
equilibrium of the non-zero-sum game by using the ǫ-saddle points in the zero-sum case.
To avoid the technical difficulties stemming from the verification of the path regularity of some
related processes, we assume that the state space is at most countable. Besides, we assume that
the payoff function U i is uniformly continuous in (t, s). These assumptions, though restricted, help
us concentrate on the interesting parts of the paper. It can be expected that the result still holds
in a more general framework (The right continuity of U i is always in force).
Compared to the non-zero-sum Dynkin game (see e.g., [3, 6]), our game is more applicable. In
practice, even if a player has made the decision first, her payoff can still be affected by other players’
decisions later on. Therefore, it is more reasonable to let the game end at the maximum rather
than the minimum of the stopping strategies. As far as we know, this is the first paper studying
the stopping games with this feature in a non-zero-sum setup. (Recently there are two papers [1,2]
on the stopping games with this feature in the zero-sum case.)
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we introduce the setup and the main
result. In Section 3, we provide some results in the zero-sum case. In Section 4, we use the results
from the zero-sum case to construct an ǫ-Nash equilibrium for the non-zero-sum stopping games.
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22. The setup and the main result
Let (Ω,F , (Ft)t∈[0,∞],P) be a filtered probability space, where without loss of generality F =
F∞ = ∪t∈[0,∞)Ft, and the filtration (Ft)t∈[0,∞] satisfies the usual conditions. To avoid the technical
difficulties stemming from the verification of the path regularities of some related related processes,
we assume that Ω is at most countable, and that P is supported on Ω. Let T be the set of stopping
times taking values in [0,∞]. For any σ ∈ T , denote Tσ (resp. Tσ+) as the set of stopping times
that is no less (resp. strictly greater) than σ. Let
T := {φ : [0,∞]× Ω 7→ [0,∞] : φ is B([0,∞)) ⊗F −measurable, and ∀t ∈ [0,∞), φ(t, ·) ∈ Tt+}.
Definition 2.1. ρ = (ρ0, ρ1) is said to be a stopping strategy, if ρ0 ∈ T and ρ1 ∈ T. Denote the
set of stopping strategies as T.
For σ ∈ T and φ ∈ T, denote φ(σ) := φ(σ(·), ·). For any ρ = (ρ0, ρ1), τ = (τ0, τ1) ∈ T, denote
ρ[τ ] := ρ01{ρ0≤τ0} + ρ1(τ0)1{ρ0>τ0}.
For i = 1, 2, let U i : [0,∞) × [0,∞) × Ω 7→ R, such that U(s, t) is Fs∨t-measurable. For simplicity,
we assume that U i is bounded, and for any s, t ∈ [0,∞), the limits
U i(s,∞) := inf
b→∞
U i(s, b), U i(∞, t) := inf
a→∞
U i(a, t), U i(∞,∞) := inf
a,b→∞
U i(a, b)
exist, i = 1, 2. We make the following assumption on U i.
Assumption 2.2. There exists a bounded non-decreasing function r : [0,∞] 7→ R+ with limhց0 r(h) =
r(0) = 0, and∣∣U i(s, t, ·) − U i(s′, t′, ·)∣∣ ≤ r (|s− s′|+ |t− t′|) , ∀s, t, s′, t′ ∈ [0,∞], i = 1, 2.
Consider the two-player non-zero-sum stopping game
ui(ρ, τ) = E
[
U i(ρ[τ ], τ [ρ])
]
(2.1)
= E
[
U i(ρ0, τ1(ρ0))1{ρ0<τ0} + U
i(ρ1(τ0), τ0)1{ρ0>τ0} + U
i(ρ0, ρ0)1{ρ0=τ0}
]
,
ρ = (ρ0, ρ1), τ = (τ0, τ1) ∈ T, i = 1, 2. Here the first player choose ρ to maximize u
1 and the second
player choose τ to maximize u2.
Recall the definition of an ǫ-Nash equilibrium.
Definition 2.3. For ǫ > 0, (ρ∗, τ∗) ∈ T2 is said to be an ǫ-Nash equilibrium for the stopping game
(2.1), if for any ρ, τ ∈ T,
u1(ρ, τ∗) ≤ u1(ρ∗, τ∗) + ǫ and u2(ρ∗, τ) ≤ u2(ρ∗, τ∗) + ǫ.
Below is the main result of this paper.
Theorem 2.4. Under Assumption 2.2, there exists an ǫ-Nash equilibrium for (2.1) for any ǫ > 0.
33. Zero-sum case
In this section, we consider (2.1) in the zero-sum case, i.e., we assume U1 = −U2 := U throughout
this section. For t ∈ [0,∞], let
Xt := inf
σ∈Tt
Et[U(t, σ)], Yt := sup
σ∈Tt
Et[U(σ, t)] and Zt := U(t, t),
where Eσ[·] := E[·|Fσ] for any σ ∈ T . Obviously,
Xt ≤ Zt ≤ Yt. (3.1)
Lemma 3.1. The processes (Xt)t∈[0,∞] and (Yt)t∈[0,∞] are right continuous.
Proof. Fix t ∈ [0,∞). Let tn ց t with |tn − t| < 1/n. Let
X˜v := inf
σ∈Tv
Ev [U(t, σ)] , v ∈ Tt.
Then X˜t = Xt. We have that
lim sup
n→∞
|Xtn −Xt| ≤ lim sup
n→∞
|Xtn − X˜tn |+ lim sup
n→∞
|X˜tn − X˜t|.
Now
lim sup
n→∞
|Xtn − X˜tn | = lim sup
n→∞
∣∣∣∣ infσ∈Ttn Etn [U(tn, σ)]− infσ∈Ttn Etn [U(t, σ)]
∣∣∣∣
≤ lim sup
n→∞
sup
σ∈Ttn
Etn |U(tn, σ) − U(t, σ)|
≤ lim sup
n→∞
r(1/n)
= 0.
By [5, Theorem D.7], lim supn→∞ |X˜tn − X˜t| = 0. Hence, the result follows. 
Let
V (ρ0, τ0) := E
[
Xρ01{ρ0<τ0} + Yτ01{ρ0>τ0} + Zρ01{ρ0=τ0}
]
, ρ, τ ∈ T ,
and consider the zero-sum Dynkin game
v := sup
ρ0∈T
inf
τ0∈T
V (ρ0, τ0) and v := inf
τ0∈T
sup
ρ0∈T
V (ρ0, τ0). (3.2)
By (3.1) and Lemma 3.1, and the game has a value and there exists an ǫ-saddle point (ρǫ0, τ
ǫ
0) ∈ T
2
for any ǫ > 0,. That is, v = v and for any ρ0, τ0 ∈ T ,
V (ρ0, τ
ǫ
0)− ǫ < V (ρ
ǫ
0, τ
ǫ
0) < V (ρ
ǫ
0, τ0) + ǫ.
Now let h > 0. For each n ∈ N, let ρ¯(nh) ∈ Tnh be the ǫ-optimizer for Ynh. That is,
Enh [U(ρ¯(nh), nh)] ≥ sup
σ∈Tnh
E [U(σ, nh)] − ǫ.
Define ρh : [0,∞] ×Ω 7→ [0,∞],
ρh(t) := ρ¯ (([t/h] + 1) h) , t ∈ [0,∞), (3.3)
4and ρh(∞) = ∞. Then it is easy to see that ρh ∈ T. Similarly, let τ¯(nh) be the ǫ-optimizer for
Xnh, and define τh : [0,∞] × Ω 7→ [0,∞],
τh(t) := τ¯ (([t/h] + 1) h) , t ∈ [0,∞), (3.4)
and τh(∞) =∞. Observe that ρh(·, ω) and τh(·, ω) are right continuous for each ω ∈ Ω. This right
continuity will play an important role in the proof of Theorem 2.4 in the next section.
Lemma 3.2. For any ǫ > 0, there exists h′ > 0, such that for any h ∈ (0, h′),
Xρ0 > Eρ0 [U(ρ0, τh(ρ0))] − 2ǫ and Yτ0 < Eτ0 [U(ρh(τ0), τ0)] + 2ǫ, ∀ρ0, τ0 ∈ T , (3.5)
Proof. For τ0 ∈ T , denote τ0h = ([τ0/h] + 1)h. Then
|Yτ0 − Eτ0 [U(ρh(τ0), τ0)]|
≤
∣∣∣∣∣ supσ∈Tτ0 Eτ0 [U(σ, τ0)]− Eτ0 [U(ρ¯(τ0h), τ0h)]
∣∣∣∣∣+ |Eτ0 [U(ρ¯(τ0h), τ0h)]− Eτ0 [U(ρ¯(τ0h), τ0)]|
≤
∣∣∣∣∣ supσ∈Tτ0 Eτ0 [U(σ, τ0)]− Eτ0 [Eτ0h [U(ρ¯(τ0h), τ0h)]]
∣∣∣∣∣+ r(h)
≤
∣∣∣∣∣ supσ∈Tτ0 Eτ0 [U(σ, τ0)]− Eτ0
[
sup
σ∈Tτ0h
Eτ0h [U(σ, τ0h)]
]∣∣∣∣∣+ ǫ+ r(h)
≤
∣∣∣∣∣ supσ∈Tτ0 Eτ0 [U(σ, τ0)]− Eτ0
[
sup
σ∈Tτ0h
Eτ0h [U(σ, τ0)]
]∣∣∣∣∣+ ǫ+ 2r(h)
=
∣∣∣∣∣ supσ∈Tτ0 Eτ0 [U(σ, τ0)]− supσ∈Tτ0h Eτ0 [U(σ, τ0)]
∣∣∣∣∣+ ǫ+ 2r(h)
=
∣∣∣∣∣ supσ∈Tτ0 Eτ0 [U(σ, τ0)]− supσ∈Tτ0 Eτ0 [U(σ ∨ τ0h, τ0)]
∣∣∣∣∣+ ǫ+ 2r(h)
≤ sup
σ∈Tτ0
Eτ0 |U(σ, τ0)− U(σ ∨ τh, τ0)|+ ǫ+ 2r(h)
≤ 3r(h) + ǫ.
Now choose h′ > 0, such that r(h′) < ǫ/3. Then the result follows. 
Proposition 3.3. For any ǫ > 0, let ρǫ = (ρǫ0, ρh) and τ
ǫ = (τ ǫ0 , τh), where (ρ
ǫ
0, τ
ǫ
0) is a saddle point
for (3.2), and h is small enough such that (3.5) holds. Then (ρǫ, τ ǫ) is a 5ǫ-Nash equilibrium for
(2.1) when U1 = −U2 = U . Hence Theorem 2.4 holds in the zero-sum case.
5Proof. Let ρ = (ρ0, ρ1) ∈ T. We have that
u1(ρ, τ ǫ) = E
[
U(ρ0, τh(ρ0))1{ρ0<τǫ0} + U(ρ1(τ
ǫ
0), τ
ǫ
0)1{ρ0>τǫ0} + U(ρ0, ρ0)1{ρ0=τǫ0}
]
= E
[
Eρ0 [U(ρ0, τh(ρ0))] 1{ρ0<τǫ0} + Eτ
ǫ
0
[U(ρ1(τ
ǫ
0), τ
ǫ
0)] 1{ρ0>τǫ0} + U(ρ0, ρ0)1{ρ0=τǫ0}
]
≤ E
[
Xρ01{ρ0>τǫ0} + Yτ
ǫ
0
1{ρ0<τǫ0} + Zρ01{ρ0=τǫ0}
]
+ 2ǫ
≤ E
[
Xρǫ01{ρǫ0>τǫ0} + Yτ
ǫ
0
1{ρǫ0<τǫ0} + Zρ
ǫ
0
1{ρǫ0=τǫ0}
]
+ 3ǫ
≤ E
[
Eρǫ0
[U(ρǫ0, τh(ρ
ǫ
0))] 1{ρǫ0<τǫ0} + Eτ
ǫ
0
[U(ρh(τ
ǫ
0), τ
ǫ
0)] 1{ρǫ0>τǫ0} + U(ρ
ǫ
0, ρ
ǫ
0)1{ρǫ0=τǫ0}
]
+ 5ǫ
= u1(ρǫ, τ ǫ) + 5ǫ.
Similarly, we can show that
u2(ρǫ, τ) ≤ u2(ρǫ, τ ǫ) + 5ǫ.

Remark 3.4. We can also consider the sub-game of (2.1)
uiσ(ρ, τ) = Eσ
[
U i(ρ[τ ], τ [ρ])
]
, (ρ, τ) ∈ T2σ, σ ∈ T , i = 1, 2, (3.6)
where
Tσ := {(ρ0, ρ1) ∈ T : ρ0 ≥ σ}.
Follow the same proof as above, we can show that ((ρǫσ , ρh), (τ
ǫ
σ, ρh)) ∈ T
2
σ is a 5ǫ-Nash equilibrium
for (3.6) when U1 = −U2 = U , where (ρǫσ, τ
ǫ
σ) is an ǫ-saddle point for the sub-Dynkin game
vσ := sup
ρ∈Tσ
inf
τ∈Tσ
Eσ
[
Xρ01{ρ0<τ0} + Yτ01{ρ0>τ0} + Zρ01{ρ0=τ0}
]
= inf
τ∈Tσ
sup
ρ∈Tσ
Eσ
[
Xρ01{ρ0<τ0} + Yτ01{ρ0>τ0} + Zρ01{ρ0=τ0}
]
.
Moreover, as can be seen from the proof of Proposition 3.3, for any (ρ0, ρ1) ∈ Tσ,
u1σ((ρ0, ρ1), (τ
ǫ
σ , τh)) ≤ vσ + 4ǫ.
4. Proof of Theorem 2.4
Throughout this section, we fix ǫ > 0. For t ∈ [0,∞], let
X1t := inf
σ∈Tt
Et
[
U1(t, σ)
]
, Y 1t := sup
σ∈Tt
Et
[
U1(σ, t)
]
, Z1t = U
1(t, t),
and
X2t := sup
σ∈Tt
Et
[
U2(t, σ)
]
, Y 2t := inf
σ∈Tt
Et
[
U2(σ, t)
]
, Z2t = U
2(t, t).
Similar to (3.3) and (3.4), for i = 1, 2, let ρ¯i(nh) and τ¯ i(nh) be ǫ-optimizers for Y inh and X
i
nh
respectively, and define
ρih(t) := ρ¯
i(([t/h] + 1)h) and τ ih(t) := τ¯
i(([t/h] + 1)h).
By Lemma 3.2, we choose h small enough with r(h) < ǫ/3, such that for i = 1, 2, and any ρ0, τ0 ∈ T ,∣∣Xiρ0 − Eρ0 [U i(ρ0, τ ih(ρ0))]∣∣ ≤ 2ǫ and ∣∣Y iτ0 − Eτ0 [U i(ρih(τ0), τ0)]∣∣ ≤ 2ǫ.
6For t ∈ [0,∞], let us define
W 1t := Et
[
U1(t, τ2h(t))
]
and W 2t := Et
[
U2(ρ1h(t), t)
]
.
Lemma 4.1. For i = 1, 2, the process W i = (W it )t∈[0,∞] is right continuous.
Proof. Fix t ∈ [0,∞). Let tn ց t with |tn− t| < (1/n)∧ ([t/h]+1)h− t). Obviously, τ
2
h(tn) = τ
2
h(t).
Then
|W 1tn −W
1
t | ≤
∣∣Etn [U(tn, τ2h(t))]− Etn [U(t, τ2h(t))]∣∣+ ∣∣Etn [U(t, τ2h(t))]− Et [U(t, τ2h(t))]∣∣ .
On the right-hand-side of the inequality above, denote the first term as I and the second term as
J . We have that
I ≤ Etn
∣∣U(tn, τ2h(t))− U(t, τ2h(t))∣∣ ≤ r(1/n)→ 0.
Now consider J . Observe that the process(
fs := Et+s
[
U(t, τ2h(t))
])
s∈[0,∞]
is a martingale w.r.t. the filtration (Ft+s)s∈[0,∞] satisfying the usual conditions. By [4, Theorem
3.13, page 16], (fs)s∈[0,∞] is right continuous. Hence, J → 0. 
Consider the sub-Dynkin game G1t
v1t := sup
ρ0∈Tt
inf
τ0∈Tt
Et
[
X1ρ01{ρ0<τ0} + Y
1
τ0
1{ρ0>τ0} + Z
1
ρ0
1{ρ0=τ0}
]
(4.1)
= inf
τ0∈Tt
sup
ρ0∈Tt
Et
[
X1ρ01{ρ0<τ0} + Y
1
τ0
1{ρ0>τ0} + Z
1
ρ0
1{ρ0=τ0}
]
,
and the game G2t
v2t := inf
ρ0∈Tt
sup
τ0∈Tt
Et
[
X2ρ01{ρ0<τ0} + Y
2
τ0
1{ρ0>τ0} + Z
2
ρ0
1{ρ0=τ0}
]
(4.2)
= sup
τ0∈Tt
inf
ρ0∈Tt
Et
[
X2ρ01{ρ0<τ0} + Y
2
τ0
1{ρ0>τ0} + Z
2
ρ0
1{ρ0=τ0}
]
.
By [6, Lemma 8], the process (vit)t∈[0,∞] is right continuous for i = 1, 2. Define stopping times
µ1 := inf{t ≥ 0 : v
1
t ≤W
1
t + ǫ} and µ2 := inf{t ≥ 0 : v
2
t ≤W
2
t + ǫ}.
Since X1 ≤W 1, we have that
µ1 ≤ inf{t ≥ 0 : v
1
t ≤ X
1
t + ǫ}.
Therefore, the process (v1t )t∈[0,µ1] is a sub-martingale. Similarly, (v
2
t )t∈[0,µ2] is a sub-martingale.
Let δ > 0 that will be chosen later on. For i = 1, 2, let (ρiµi+δ, τ
i
µi+δ
) ∈ T 2µi+δ be an ǫ-saddle point
for game Giµi+δ defined in (4.1) and (4.2). Define
ρ∗0 :=

µ1, if µ1 ≤ µ2,ρ2µ2+δ, if µ1 > µ2, ρ
∗
1(t) :=

ρ
2
h(t), if t ≥ µ1 ∧ µ2 + δ and µ1 > µ2
ρ1h(t), otherwise,
and
τ∗0 :=

τ
1
µ1+δ
, if µ1 ≤ µ2,
µ2, if µ1 > µ2,
τ∗1 (t) :=

τ
1
h(t), if t ≥ µ1 ∧ µ2 + δ and µ1 ≤ µ2
τ2h(t), otherwise.
7Let ρ∗ := (ρ∗0, ρ
∗
1) and τ
∗ := (τ∗0 , τ
∗
1 ). It can been shown that ρ
∗, τ∗ ∈ T.
Proposition 4.2. For δ small enough, (ρ∗, τ∗) is an 18ǫ-Nash equilibrium for the non-zero-sum
game (2.1). Therefore, Theorem 2.4 holds.
Proof.
u1(ρ∗, τ∗) = E
[
U1 (ρ∗[τ∗], τ∗[ρ∗])
]
= E
[
U1 (ρ∗[τ∗], τ∗[τ∗])
(
1{µ1≤µ2} + 1{µ1>µ2}
)]
= E
[
U1
(
µ1, τ
2
h(µ1)
)
1{µ1≤µ2} + U
1
(
ρ1h(µ2), µ2
)
1{µ1>µ2}
]
= E
[
Eµ1
[
U1
(
µ1, τ
2
h(µ1)
)]
1{µ1≤µ2} + Eµ2
[
U1
(
ρ1h(µ2), µ2
)]
1{µ1>µ2}
]
≥ E
[
W 1µ11{µ1≤µ2} + Y
1
µ2
1{µ1>µ2}
]
− ǫ.
Now for any ρ = (ρ0, ρ1) ∈ T, we consider u
1(ρ, τ∗) = E[U1(ρ[τ∗], τ∗[ρ])]. We discuss five cases.
Case 1: A1 := {ρ0 < µ1 ∧ µ2}. We have that
E
[
U1 (ρ[τ∗], τ∗[ρ]) 1A1
]
= E
[
U1
(
ρ0, τ
2
h(ρ0)
)
1A1
]
= E
[
W 1ρ01A1
]
≤ E
[
v1ρ01A1
]
= E
[
v1ρ0∧µ1∧µ21A1
]
≤ E
[
Eρ0∧µ1∧µ2
[
v1µ1∧µ2
]
1A1
]
= E
[
v1µ1∧µ21A1
]
= E
[(
v1µ11{µ1≤µ2} + v
1
µ2
1{µ1>µ2}
)
1A1
]
≤ E
[(
W 1µ11{µ1≤µ2} + Y
1
µ2
1{µ1>µ2}
)
1A1
]
+ ǫ.
Case 2: A2 := {µ1 ∧ µ2 ≤ ρ0 < µ1 ∧ µ2 + δ} ∩ {µ1 ≤ µ2}. By Lemma 4.1
E
∣∣W 1µ1+δ −W 1µ1∣∣→ 0, δ ց 0,
and
P {([µ1/h] + 1)h − µ1 < 2δ} → 0, δ ց 0.
We choose δ small enough, such that r(δ) < ǫ, and
E
∣∣W 1µ1+δ −Wµ1∣∣ < ǫ
and
P {([µ1/h] + 1)h− µ1 < 2δ} < ǫ/M,
8where M > 0 is a constant such that |U1| < M uniformly in (s, t, ω). Then
E
[
U1 (ρ[τ∗], τ∗[ρ]) 1A2
]
= E
[
U1
(
ρ0, τ
2
h(ρ0)
)
1A2
]
≤ E
[
U1
(
ρ0, τ
2
h(µ1 + δ)
)
1A2
]
+ 2ǫ
≤ E
[
U1
(
µ1 + δ, τ
2
h(µ1 + δ)
)
1A2
]
+ 3ǫ
= E
[
W 1µ1+δ1A2
]
+ 3ǫ
≤ E
[
W 1µ11A2
]
+ 4ǫ
= E
[(
W 1µ11{µ1≤µ2} + Y
1
µ2
1{µ1>µ2}
)
1A2
]
+ 4ǫ.
Case 3: A3 := {µ1 ∧ µ2 ≤ ρ0 < µ1 ∧ µ2 + δ} ∩ {µ1 > µ2}. We choose δ small enough, such that
r(δ) < ǫ and
E
∣∣Y 1µ2+δ − Y 1µ2∣∣ < ǫ.
Then we have that
E
[
U1 (ρ[τ∗], τ∗[ρ]) 1A3
]
= E
[(
U1 (µ2, µ2) 1{ρ0=µ2} + U
1 (ρ1(µ2), µ2) 1{ρ0>µ2}
)
1A3
]
≤ E
[(
Y 1µ21{ρ0=µ2} + U
1 (ρ1(µ2) + δ, µ2 + δ) 1{ρ0>µ2}
)
1A3
]
+ 2ǫ
≤ E
[(
Y 1µ21{ρ0=µ2} + Y
1
µ2+δ1{ρ0>µ2}
)
1A3
]
+ 2ǫ
≤ E
[
Y 1µ21A3
]
+ 3ǫ
= E
[(
W 1µ11{µ1≤µ2} + Y
1
µ2
1{µ1>µ2}
)
1A3
]
+ 3ǫ.
Case 4: A4 := {ρ0 ≥ µ1 ∧ µ2 + δ} ∩ {µ1 ≤ µ2}. We choose δ small enough, such that
E
∣∣v1µ1+δ − v1µ1∣∣ < ǫ.
By Remark 3.4, we have that
E
[
U1 (ρ[τ∗], τ∗[ρ]) 1A4
]
= E
[
Eµ1+δ
[
U1 (ρ[τ∗], τ∗[ρ])
]
1A4
]
≤ E
[
v1µ1+δ1A4
]
+ 4ǫ
≤ E
[
v1µ11A4
]
+ 5ǫ
≤ E
[
W 1µ11A4
]
+ 6ǫ
= E
[(
W 1µ11{µ1≤µ2} + Y
1
µ2
1{µ1>µ2}
)
1A4
]
+ 6ǫ.
Case 5: A5 := {ρ0 ≥ µ1 ∧ µ2 + δ} ∩ {µ1 > µ2}. We choose δ small enough, such that r(δ) < ǫ,
and
E
∣∣Y 1µ2+δ − Y 1µ2∣∣ < ǫ.
9Then
E
[
U1 (ρ[τ∗], τ∗[ρ]) 1A5
]
= E
[
U1 (ρ1(µ2), µ2) 1A5
]
≤ E
[
U1 (ρ1(µ2) + δ, µ2 + δ) 1A5
]
+ 2ǫ
≤ E
[
Y 1µ2+δ1A5
]
+ 2ǫ
≤ E
[
Y 1µ21A5
]
+ 3ǫ
= E
[(
W 1µ11{µ1≤µ2} + Y
1
µ2
1{µ1>µ2}
)
1A5
]
+ 3ǫ.
From Cases 1-5, we have that
u1(ρ, τ∗) ≤ u1(ρ∗, τ∗) + 18ǫ,
for any ρ ∈ T by choosing δ small enough. Similar we can show that
u2(ρ∗, τ) ≤ u2(ρ∗, τ∗) + 18ǫ,
for any τ ∈ T by choosing δ small enough. 
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